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STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondant, 
-v-
LELAND THOMAS DEMILLE, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. 
> Case No. 860532 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The prosecution failed to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the elements of Murder in the Second Degree. 
2. The defendant failed to receive a fair and unbiased 
trial because certain jurors held unvealed biases and prejudices 
and because of juror misconduct during deliberations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Leland Thomas DeMille was arrested and 
charged with Second Degree Murder a felony of the First Degree. 
A Jury Trial was held, commencing, July 28, 1986, in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, 
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, presiding. 
At the end of the trial, the defendant was convicted by 
the jury of said charge. 
Defendant filed his motion for a new trial, August 26, 
1986, (R-173) and it was denied by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, 
on the 26th day of September, 1986. (R-197) 
On the 17th day of October, defendant filed his Notice 
of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Defendant, Leland Thomas DeMille, at the time of the 
trial was married to Jan DeMille, formerly Jan Davies, the mother 
of the deceased child, Ronald Davies. (Tr. P 680-681) They had 
been married June 7, 1985 (Tr. P 680; L 10-15) and had had a 
child born of that issue, Thomas James DeMille born May, 1986. 
(Tr. P 680; L 21-25) 
The defendant, hereinafter, sometimes, "DeMille", had 
met Jan Davies through his father who worked with Mrs. Davies1 
husband. (Tr. P 681; L 14-20) After Jan Davies and her husband 
separated, and he left her to go to Las Vegas, DeMille developed 
a friendship with Mrs. Davies that ultimately developed into a 
relationship. (Tr P 682; L 6-19) Initially, DeMille served as a 
babysitter for her son, Ronald, when he was not working, on 
occasions while she worked. (Tr. P 683; L 2-25) 
Ultimately in January, 1985, that relationship became a 
joint living arrangement while they awaited Jan Davies1 divorce 
from her husband so DeMille and Jan could be married to each 
other. (Tr. P 684; L 9-13 & Tr. P 680; L 10-15) 
Ronald Davies lived with his mother and DeMille from 
January 1985 until his death on May 9, 1985. (Tr. P 684, L 9-16) 
On Sunday, May 5, 1985, DeMille was at home doing yard 
work, among other things, (Tr. P 697, L 2-6) and caring for 
Ronnie Davies while Jan Davies DeMille worked at her job as 
police dispatcher. 
At approximately 2:15 to 2:30 p.m. DeMille called Jan 
DeMille to allow Ronald Davies to talk with his mother on the 
telephone. (Tr. P 785 & P 785; L 2-12) 
Slightly before 3:00 p.m., at 2:57 (Tr. P 646; L 
14-15) , when Jan DeMille was due to get off work, she received a 
call from DeMille informing her, "something's wrong with Ronnie." 
(Tr. P 646, L 14-19). 
Jan DeMille hurried home and upon arriving home, 
together with DeMille, they placed the child in her automobile 
and drove him to Dixie Medical Center to the emergency room. (Tr. 
P 647; L 1-3) 
The child was comatose when Mrs. DeMille arrived home 
(Tr. P 646; L 22-25) and when they delivered the child to the 
emergency room at Dixie Medical Center (Tr. P 647; L 22) at 
approximately 3:15 p.m. (Tr. P 104; L 11) 
Later in the day at approximately 5:55 p.m. Ronald 
Davies was transported to Las Vegas by a Life-Flight team for 
further treatment. (Tr. P 110; L 21-25) 
He was treated by Dr. Lonnie Hammergren and Dr. Vincent 
McCarthy in Las Vegas until May 9, 1985 when he died. (Tr. P 268; 
L 13-19) 
Dr. McCarthy assigned the cause of death to be head 
trauma. (Tr. P 269; L 6-7) 
The autopsy report, D-15, listed the Immediate Cause of 
Death: "Increased intra cranial pressure" due to: "Acute and 
subacute subdural hematoma - post craniotomy," due to: "Homicidal 
traumatic injuries - blunt force from trauma to head." 
After the jury trial was concluded and the verdict of 
guilty rendered, juror, Judith Ann Garner executed an affidavit, 
which was filed with the Motion for a New Trial, alleging 
numerous acts of misconduct or bias on the part of certain 
jurors. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant was charged by information with second 
degree murderr a first degree felony. While there may have been 
circumstantial evidence that enabled the jury to find that 
defendant did in fact cause the death of Ronald Davies, there is 
no evidence, or insufficient evidence to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the crime fits the elements or 
requirements for second degree murder as opposed to the lesser 
included crimes of manslaughter or negligent homicide. 
While there were no instructions given, and none 
requested by defendant, which would have permitted the jury to 
find either manslaughter or negligent homicide, that does not 
relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the elements of 
second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt when the elements 
of the crime, actually proved, might as easily have constituted 
manslaughter or negligent homicide, which defendant submits is 
grounds for reversal or, at the very least, reduction of the 
conviction to the lowest level possible, i.e. of manslaughter or 
negligent homicide. 
2. Defendant, with his motion for a new trial, 
submitted to the court an affidavit, executed under oath by a 
juror, alleging various incidents of unrevealed bias or 
misconduct on the part of jurors which defendant submits made a 
fair trial impossible. 
The District Court refused to hold a hearing or to 
consider said allegations to determine if they were true or not, 
all of which defendant submits is grounds for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
i - . . . . . — — . .. . — - — 
DOUBT THE ELEMENTS OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, 
The defendant, Leland Thomas DeMille, was charged in an 
Information with certain elements of Section 76-5-203 of Utah 
Code Annotated, referred to as the 2nd Degree Murder Statute, 
The elements charged are essentially those outlined in 
subparagraphs a, b and c, to wit: 
"... did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of 
Ronald Wayne Davies...," 
which is subparagraph (a). The Information inserts next an "or" 
that is not in the statute and then proceeds 
"... intending to cause serious bodily injury to Ronald 
Wayne Davies, did commit an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that caused the death of Ronald Wayne 
Davies..." 
which is subparagraph (b) and again inserting an "or" that does 
not appear in the statute, proceeds 
"... acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, the Defendant, Leland 
Thomas DeMille, engaged in conduct which created a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Ronald Wayne Davies, " 
which is subparagraph (c) of Section 76-5-203. (See Information, 
R-32-33) 
The prosecution attempted to prove the death of Ronald 
Wayne Davies was caused by a massive blow to the head during a 
time when only the defendant was with him, ergo defendant caused 
his death. 
There was no testimony of any one describing the 
infliction of the injury and no direct evidence whatever of how 
the blow was inflicted or even that it was, indeed, inflicted by 
the defendant. 
Hence, the evidence against defendant was entirely 
circumstantial, that is, the blow or trauma to the head, 
according to the prosecution's expert witnesses, had to have 
occurred within a certain limited time period and because 
defendant was with him, and the only person with him, during that 
time period, defendant must have caused the blow to his head that 
ultimately killed him. (See testimony of Dr. Walker, McCarthy & 
Clark) 
The prosecution submitted evidence, though disputed or 
questioned, that could and apparently did enable the jury to 
believe that the injury was caused by a relatively heavy blow. 
(See Tr. P 553; L 5-11) The evidence was of an extensive skull 
fracture and of a rather large subdural hematoma. But, does 
evidence of a serious or severe injury suffice to satisfy all the 
necessary requirements of the Second Degree Murder Statute? 
In determining the answer to that question, one must 
look at the Manslaughter Statute, 76-5-205, and the Negligent 
Homicide Statute, 76-5-206, and a comparison of them must be made 
to the 2nd Degree Murder Statute, 76-5-203. 
The crucial portion of 76-5-205, the Manslaughter 
statute reads: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if 
the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
or 
(b) causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provided a 
legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under 
the existing circumstances. 
and the crucial portion of 76-5-206f the Negligent Homicide 
Statute reads: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
. . . 
The distinction between 76-5-203, the crime of Murder 
in the 2nd Degree, and 76-5-205 Manslaughter, is essentially the 
element of intent. 
Second Degree Murder requires that the accused (a) 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another while 
Manslaughter requires only that the accused (a) recklessly causes 
the death of another and negligent homicide requires only that 
the accused ... act with criminal negligence in causing the death 
of another. 
Because the State has the burden of proving all of the 
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
accused has no obligation to prove that one of the lesser 
included offenses is really the crime of which he is guilty and 
not the one charged, i.e. Murder in the Second Degree. 
Therefore, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
was the intent of the accused to cause the death of another and 
not that it was simply caused by his reckless conduct or his 
negligent conduct. 
The recent case of State vs. Eolsinger 699 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1985) decided by this Court is important in analyzing this 
case. 
As that case pointed out very succinctly: 
Section 76-1-501(1) presumes a defendant to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt; 
the requisite actus reus and mens rea set out in 
section 76-1-501(2) constitute the elements of the 
offense as follows: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
In the present case there is no evidence whatever of 
the circumstances surrounding the death of the child other than 
the circumstantial evidence that the child must have been 
subjected to a severe or heavy blow to the head. 
The State no doubt would argue that that circumstance 
is sufficient to justify a conviction under subparagraph (b) or 
(c) of Section 76-5-203. However, the Bolsinger case would 
dispose of that assumption as well. 
After citing and quoting Sections 76-2-103(2), on page 
1219 states: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to 
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to 
a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
The court then stated: 
Correlating the conduct, circumstances, and result 
required under the depraved indifference statute 
and the mens rea of knowledge as promulgated in 
State v. Fontana, supra, we conclude that the 
following elements had to be present to properly 
convict the defendant under the State's third 
theory: 
1. The defendant engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and that 
conduct resulted in the death of another—the 
actus reus. 
2. The defendant knew that his conduct or the 
circumstances surrounding his conduct created a 
grave risk of death to another—the mens rea. 
3. Defendant acted under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life—a qualitative judgment to be made by the 
jury in determining the extent of the defendant's 
conduct. It is not a^  description of the mens rea 
involved in the commission of the crime, but an 
evaluation of the actus reus. (Emphasis added) 
The court in that case, realizing that the accused in 
that case actually entwined an electric cord around the neck of 
the deceased and pulled it tight - at least, tight enough to 
cause her death, and admitted that he had done so, still on page 
1219 stated: 
There is no question that defendant engaged in 
conduct creating a grave risk of death and 
actually resulting in death. It is the degree of 
culpability as well as the evaluation of the 
conduct that we question here. As enunciated 
under State v. Fontana, knowledge of one's conduct 
or the circumstances surrounding the conduct is 
the cognizance that the conduct or the 
circumstances surrounding it create a 
life-endangering risk to another. 
In the instant case, there was no admission by the 
defendant that he had in any way caused the injury that caused 
the death. The jury apparently believed those witnesses that 
testified the injury had to have occurred while the child was in 
his exclusive custody, and then drew the conclusion that he must 
have inflicted the injury. But, that is not evidence of his mens 
rea, only, as the Bolsinger case points out, of the actus reus. 
In Bolsinger, the court noted that the defendant denied 
having intended any harm (page 1218) . That was the only direct 
evidence of his intent. The State had no evidence otherwise, 
just as in this case, the state was not able and did not, present 
any evidence of what the defendant's state of mind was when, and 
if, he caused the blow that resulted in the injury to the child. 
There is no evidence that it was neither the result of 
a reckless act nor a criminally negligent act as opposed to an 
intentional act. 
Because the defendant does not himself provide the 
evidence of what the facts were, what his mens rea was, does not 
relieve the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it was an intentional act as opposed to a reckless act 
or a negligent act. The jury, no matter how severe the injury, 
cannot simply presume the necessary mens rea to find him guilty 
of the highest possible degree of crime, to wit, in this case, 
2nd Degree murder, rather than the less severe crimes that he 
might have been guilty of committing. 
This court, in Bolsinger, after noting there was no 
evidence of the necessary mens rea, in that case, to commit 2nd 
Degree Murder, on page 1219 stated: 
Given those facts reasonable minds must perforce 
entertain reasonable doubt that there was that 
degree of awareness with respect to the 
defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances 
to impute to him the knowledge that his conduct 
created a grave risk of killing Kaysie and that he 
possessed the medical knowledge that compounding 
factors existed which would hasten her death. 
In the instant case, even assuming that the defendant 
did something (the actus reus) which resulted in the death of the 
child, there is no evidence that the defendant understood and 
intended that that act could or would cause the child's death. 
There is no evidence that he did not temporarily black out. 
There is no evidence that he did not suffer temporary insanity, 
and that he even know what he was doing as he did it. There is 
no evidence that he did notf in a playful mood toss the child in 
the air, intending to catch him as he came down,— as many loving 
fathers do— but slipped himself and missed him, allowing him to 
hit his head on a hard object in the bathroom or elsewhere. 
There is no evidence that the defendant did not, because of the 
terrible emotional trauma the child's injury caused, simply 
himself black-out all knowledge or recollection of what did 
happen during that terrible few moments. There is no evidence 
that a hundred other things, short of an intentional taking of 
the child's life, might not have happened. But because there is 
no evidence that any one of these possible things might not have 
happened does not mean the prosecution is relieved of its burden 
to prove the intent necessary to constitute 2nd degree murder, 
and that the jury can, without any evidence whatsoever of what 
did happen, simply assume that there was the requisite mens rea 
to find him guilty of the higher, most serious of all the 
possibilities available to them. 
The State may argue that the defendant should have 
asked for an instruction, which he did not, which would have 
suggested to the jury they could find, as an alternative, either 
recklessness or negligence. But it is not the defendant's 
obligation to prove his innocence or that the State has not 
proved what it has charged him with. It is the State's 
obligation to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt precisely what it 
has accused him of doing. 
In Bolsinger, on page 1218, the Court dealt with 
subparagraph (c) of 76-5-203, which requires, to find murder in 
the Second Degree, that the accused was, 
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another. 
It stated on page 1219 regarding that case: 
There is, however, sufficient evidence that the 
defendant was aware of, but consciously 
disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that placing and/or pulling a cord around the 
victim's neck would result in her death. 
And the court again on page 1219 continued: 
That risk was of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constituted a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed 
from defendant's standpoint. Such conduct is 
"reckless" under section 76-2-103 (3). 
In the instant casef the jury did not even know what 
the conduct of the defendant was, for there was no evidence 
whatsoever of what his actual conduct was. 
In Bolsingerf on page 1220 the Court goes on to point 
out what the jury must know to find the requisite element of 
guilt: 
In evaluating the defendants conduct, reasonable 
minds must be free from reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty of depraved indifference to 
the grave risk of death created by his conduct. 
To constitute depraved indifference, the act must 
be one "which has been rather well understood at 
common law to involve something more serious than 
mere recklessness alone which has had an 
incidental tragic result." 
Again it is the State's obligation to present evidence 
that the act met that standard. 
The Court continued on page 1220: 
There must be a knowing doing of an uncalled for 
act in callous disregard of its likely harmful 
effect on a victim, which is so heinous as to be 
equivalent to a "specific intent" to kill. 
(Emphasis added) 
The court on page 1220 went on to describe what must be 
shown (beyond a reasonable doubt)—not just surmised—to meet the 
requirement of depraved indifference. 
Depraved indifference to human life is 
characterized by unmitigated wickedness, extreme 
inhumanity or acts exhibiting a high degree of 
wantonness. People v. Northrup, 83 A.D.2d 737, 
442 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1981). 
Again there was no evidence of such behavior whatever. 
The only evidence as to the continuing on-going relationship 
between the defendant and the deceased child was the testimony of 
several witnesses who had observed their relationship. Garland 
J. Turner on page 603 of the Trial Transcript said after being 
asked if he could describe the relationship: 
A. Well, I'd say what described it most was 
lovingf kind. Tom (the defendant) was always 
helping. Ronnie was a smart boy, I mean, for 
three, he knew his ABC's and could count to 30 and 
it was - several times I seen them kissing. 
Ronnie would call him "Dad"—"Daddy"; you know, 
and he was happy. It was love. 
and again on page 605, he added: 
Q: Now at any time when he was in the home, did 
you ever see Mr. DeMille discipline him in any 
way? 
A: No, In fact it was just like I said, love, 
kissing. It would surprise you. It did me. 
that... 
Q: Why did it surprise you? 
A: I knew Ronnie wasn't his real son. It kinda 
shocked you. 
Q: You mean what shocked you? 
A. To see the relationship they had. You know, 
like I say, it was love. 
Leland Vaughn DeMille, defendant's father was asked 
what kind of relationship did he observe between the defendant 
and the child, page 617. 
A: Very good 
Q. Can you describe what you mean by "very good?" 
A. Oh, a great deal of love there. 
Q. Did you ever see Tom Davies cruel or in any 
way strike—not Tom Davies, Tom DeMille strike 
Ron Davies? 
A: No sir, I never did. 
Q: Did you ever see him in any way attempt to 
correct anything he did? 
A: Just by talking to him. 
Q: Okay, and what was the relationship-well, not 
the relationship, but how did Ronald Davies act 
towards Tom? 
A: Real nice. I mean, you know, he was on his 
lap more than he was off his lap. There was a 
great deal of love there. 
Q: Did he ever appear to be afraid of Mr. 
DeMille? 
A: No. No. he never did. 
Jan DeMille, the defendant's wife and the mother of 
Ronald Davies testified page 626: 
A: He (Ronald Davies) took to Tom (defendant) 
right away. He wanted to go everywhere with him. 
He loved him dearly. He started calling him 
"Daddy" and his own father he called "Harley." 
Again on page 628 
Q: Now, during that period of time, did you 
observe the relationship that developed between 
Ronnie and Tom DeMille? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q. Can you describe, the best way you can, what 
that relationship was? 
A: Ronnie adored Tom. He walked up to Tom one 
day and asked if Tom would marry both of us and if 
he — he would go up to Tom for a kiss and Tom 
would tease him and say, "No, I'm not going to 
give you a kiss," and he would get so upset. He 
just hung on. He wanted to be with him 
everywhere. He would get upset if he couldn't go 
for a ride with him, or if some reason Tom 
couldn't do it. When he would go to the dump, for 
instance, and he had things that he was dumping 
that he didn't want to take Ronnie, Ronnie would 
get really upset, and he would wait by the door 
until his daddy got home. And he called him 
"Daddy." 
Also on page 656, Jan DeMille testified: 
Q: Now, Mrs. DeMille, I think you earlier 
described the relationship that your husband, Mr* 
DeMille, had with Ronnie Davis. 
Q: Did you ever have any reason to suspect that 
there was any kind of abuse being inflicted upon 
your son by Mr. Davies - or Mr. DeMille? 
A: If I had thought that Tom had abused my son, I 
would have thrown him out of there. He never did. 
All he did was love him. (Emphasis added) 
Of course, the defendant himself described his 
relationship with Ronnie, the child as one of mutual love. 
The most the State could do to dispell that 
relationship was introduce evidence of a previous accident and 
leave the jury to assume that defendant must have somehow been 
responsible and to introduce testimony of nurses, doctors and the 
pathologist of bruises, after the injury which apparently caused 
his death, to suggest there was some kind of abuse of the child. 
However, in that respect, it is interesting to note the 
testimony of Dr. VanNorman, the emergency room doctor who 
examined him when he was first brought to the hospital emergency 
room to determine the type and nature of his affliction. See 
page 211 et seq. of the Trial Transcript. 
Q: What else did you examine? 
A: I did a general exam, listened to his lungs, 
pressed on his abdomen, looked at his extremities. 
Q: And do you look for other type of injuries? 
You realize there might be head injuries. Do you 
look for other injuries concurrent with that head 
injury? 
A: Certainly. 
Q: And what do you do in that regard? What do 
you look for and where do you look? 
A: Okay. You examine the skin, looking the kid 
over, basically seeing what else might be going 
on, whether there's evidence of trauma or illness. 
Q: Okay, do you look for fractured bones, that 
sort of thing— 
A: Sure. 
Q: —that might come along too? 
A: Sure. 
Q: And did you find anything of that nature? 
A: In looking over the rest of the child, he had 
a few little marks consistent with his healing of 
chickenpox, and he had a few scattered bruises 
over his extremeties and a few on his trunk. But 
other than the one on his forehead, nothing that 
seemed to be of much clinical relevance at that 
point. 
Q: Where did you observe bruises on his body, 
besides— you said something about his forehead? 
Let's leave that one for a minute and go to the 
rest of the body. Where did you find bruises 
elsewhere? 
A: On the front of his shins, thighs, a few on 
his chest and abdomen, 
Q: How severe were they on his chest and abdomen? 
A: To me they did not appear particularly severe. 
Q: As a matter of fact, when you testified 
previously, you didn't even indicate that there 
were any on his chest and abdomen, did you? 
A: What I had seen and written is that, as I 
indicated, there were a few on his trunk, but they 
did not impress me. 
Q: They were not serious enough to even be 
concerned about, were they? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: As a matter of fact, most of the bruises that 
you saw on him were bruises that are consistent 
with a three-year-old child that maybe bumps into 
chairs, or that sort of thing, is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Most of them were on his shins? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you see any elsewhere on his body, 
other than on the shins and the trunk or— 
A: I did not examine his back or his buttocks. 
But, no, on the surfaces I examined, I didn't see 
any others other than what I've described. 
Q: Okay, None on the arms? 
A: I don't believe so. 
Q: And can you describe the ones that you saw on 
his chest and on his stomach? 
A: Small centimeter size. 
Q: And circular—when you say "centimeter in 
size," that's very small, isn't it? 
A: Yeah. 
Q. Less than an inch? 
THE COURT: You have to answer out loud. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Half inch or so. 
Q: (By Mr. Wright) And there were none that 
appeared to be extensive or elongated, or anything 
of that nature, were there, on his body? 
A: No, I did not see any. 
Q: Okay. And none on his arms? 
A: I don't recall any on his arms. 
Q: Well, when you gave statements earlier and at 
that time you hadn't observed any either, had you? 
A: I don't believe so. 
Q: Now, you indicated there was—appeared to be a 
bruise on his forehead, is that right? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And what type of bruise did that appear to be? 
Can you describe it? 
A: Yes. This was, oh, one to two centimeter, 
probably, two centimeter area with a series of 
tiny bruises that might almost be called 
petechiae, p-e-t-e-c~h-i-a-e. That's a very fine 
millimeter, or so, skin discoloration. And these 
were sitting in a cluster. They had not become 
confluent, had not merge together yet. 
Q: Was there any bruise—I mean, excuse me, any 
swelling, or anything, consistent with that? 
A: I frankly don't recall. 
Q: Was there any other bruises on the forehead? 
A: No. 
In spite of doctors and nurses, most of whom saw him 
later after treatment including, forced intubation, the drilling 
of at least two bur holes in the skull, (See P 569 of 
Transcript,) one of which was done with a cloward drill which was 
not designed for that purpose (see Transcript P 570; L 10 to P 
571; L 15) a craniotomy—the removal of a large portion of the 
skull (Tr P 509, L 6-19)-all of which could easily have caused 
the bruises reported by the doctors and others who saw the child 
later, some not even until after his death. 
See for example the testimony of Dr. Clark the 
pathologist that taping the intubation tubes by the doctor and 
nurses had caused lacerations and bruises on the child's face 
during treatment. (Tr. P 372; L 5-19). This would indicate that 
many of the bruises reported by the pathologist, but not reported 
by the emergency room doctor could have been caused by the 
treatment. 
All of this discussion is in preface to citations in 
the Bolsinger case to the type of conduct that might qualify to 
prove "depraved indifference to human life." The court, after 
quoting from People vs. Northrup, 83 A.D. 2d. 737, 442 N.Y.2d 658 
(1981) on page 1220 among other cases: 
Depraved indifference to human life is 
characterized by unmitigated wickedness, 
extreme inhumanity or acts exhibiting a high 
degree of wantoness. 
cited representative casesf page 1220: 
In sharp contrast to defendant's conduct here, 
conduct in the following cases was properly held 
to constitute depraved indifference: Neitzel, 
supra (defendant fired several shots directly at 
girl friend while she sat on the ground. Some 
struck the ground within an inch of the victim 
before the fatal shot entered her head); People v. 
Lilly, 71 A.D.2d 393f 422 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1979) 
(defendant inflicted vicious and brutal injuries 
on 6 1/2-pound baby girl over period of one month 
and sought no medical attention to ease 
substantial pain); People v. LeGrand, 61 A.D.2d 
815, 402 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1978), cert, denied, 
LeGrand v. New York, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S. Ct. 117, 
58 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1978) (defendant beat former 
wife to death, dragged her body down two flights 
of stairs, chopped her up and stuffed her into 
plastic bags for easier disposal); State v. 
Nicholson, Utah 585 P.2d 60 (1978) (defendant 
neglected and mistreated small son for a period in 
excess of five months. Victim was found dead of 
malnutrition and dehydration in garbage, spoiled 
food and human feces reaching a depth of three 
feet in some places) . 
Admittedly these are simply examples, but no evidence 
presented by the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Leland Thomas DeMille's conduct came even close to comparing to 
these kinds of examples nor met the standard required by the 
Bolsinger Court. As the court pointed out on page 1220: 
The evidence here simply does not support a 
finding of depravity in the conduct of the 
defendant that caused the death of Kaysie. 
And it does not in the instant case. Again it is the 
State's burden to prove every element of the crime it charges. 
It simply cannot say, as it did in this case, the child died by a 
very severe blow to the head, the defendant was the only person 
present when that blow must have happened, Ergo, he is guilty of 
a "depraved indifference to human life. 
This Court in the Bolsinger case on page 1221 pointed 
out: 
The jury may well have been swayed by the 
reprehensible conduct of the defendant subsequent 
to her death. But that conduct is not before us 
for review. 
Defendant submits that in this case the jury "may well 
have been swayed..." by an irrelevant or improper consideration 
by the jury as well, as will be discussed in the next section, 
but regardless, that does not release the State from proving 
every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant submits the State has not proven, even if it 
proved defendant caused the death of Ronald Davies, that it was 
with the requisite intent to make it Second Degree Murder as 
opposed to Manslaughter or Criminal Negligence. 
POINT II 
II. THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO RECEIVE A FAIR 
AND UNBIASED TRIAL BECAUSE CERTAIN JURORS HELD UNREVEALED BIASES 
AND PREJUDICES AND BECAUSE OF JUROR MISCONDUCT DURING 
DELIBERATIONS. 
One of the trial jurors, Judith Ann Garner came to 
appellant's attorney in a distraught state of mind and reported 
what she has memorialized in an affidavit which was included 
with defendant's motion for a new trial. (See R-176-179) 
In that affidavit the Juror alleged several facts which 
appellant submits constituted improper bias and prejudice and 
conduct on the part of several jurors, all of which served to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, were a violation of his 
due process rights, and made a mockery of the verdict reached in 
his case. 
The relevant portions of said affidavit are as follows: 
4. During said deliberations co-juror, Kathleen 
J. Ence, announced, to affiant and other 
jurors assembled in said jury room, that she 
had been previously married to a "child 
abuser" and to a "spouse abuser." 
5. Said juror, Kathleen J. Ence, further stated 
to the affiant and the other jurors in said 
jury room during said deliberations, that 
while the defendant's attorney was giving his 
closing argument, she, Kathleen Ence, prayed, 
". . .that if said attorney made eye contact 
with her she would know he was telling the 
truth, but if he did not she would know he was 
not telling the truth about defendant; that he 
did not make eye contact with her, so she knew 
said attorney was not telling the truth," 
concerning the defendant. 
6. That an inquiry was made of the religious 
affiliation of the jurors and all but one of 
which claimed to be members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 
7. Said juror, Kathleen Ence, was one of the 
leaders, during the deliberations by the jury, 
of the faction seeking a speedy and early 
determination of guilt of the defendant. 
8. That juror, Teresa Bean stated to the other 
jurors that ". . .she had gone by the home of 
the defendant (not necessarily during the 
trial, but previously) and knew exactly what 
was going on." 
9. That jurors, during deliberations discussed 
the possibility that the deceased child was 
autistic and that could have led the defendant 
to committing the crime, even though there was 
no evidence presented by either the 
prosecution of the defense that the child was 
autistic or had a similar condition. 
10. One juror, the name of whom, affiant does not 
know, stated to the other jurors that she had 
worked with abused children in a professional 
capacity and understood matters of this kind. 
11. That the jurors who favored conviction seemed 
to manufacture circumstances not in evidence, 
such as the possible autism of the child 
victim, their own experience with abused 
children, etc., to justify a finding of guilt 
of the defendant in the above case. 
12. Affiant, during said deliberations observed 
and noted, together with the other jurors, 
that two of the older jurors appeared ill and 
emotionally distressed during said 
deliberations, that there was concern by all 
of the remaining jurors for the health and 
welfare of said two older jurors during said 
deliberations and they felt the need to 
conclude the deliberations quickly because of 
that concern for the well being and health of 
the two older jurors. 
13. Affiant felt intimidated and overly pressured 
by her's, and some of the other more outspoken 
jurors', concern for the physical and 
emotional well-being of the said two older 
jurors and by the late hour the case was 
turned over to the jury for deliberations and 
the insistence by said outspoken jurors, who 
were seeking conviction, for a quick, speedy 
decision based upon their concern, among other 
things, for the health and welfare of the said 
two older jurors. 
14. That the affiant, herself was concerned for 
the emotional condition of said two older 
jurors and felt "pressured" by such 
considerations, unrelated to the merits of the 
case, and that she changed her position based 
upon that pressure and concern rather than 
because she was persuaded that the State had 
proved the case pursuant to the requisite 
standard imposed by the instruction made to 
the jury by the Court. 
The errors or improprieties, if true, as recounted in 
said affidavit are numerous but can be summarized as follows: 
1. Juror bias: 
(a) Ence stated during deliberations she had 
previously been married to a child and a 
spouse abuser. 
(b) Unnamed juror stated she had previously 
worked with abused children 
(c) Bean stated she had gone by the 
appellant's home "... and knew exactly 
what was going on." 
2. Juror Impropriety: 
(a) Ence stated she had prayed during the 
closing argument that if appellant's 
attorney made eye contact with her she 
would know he was telling the truth, but 
if he did not that he was not telling 
the truth, and that he had not. 
(b) Religious affiliation of jurors was 
discussed during deliberations. 
3. Improper consideration during deliberations: 
(a) Assumption, without any evidence to 
support it that child was probably 
autistic. 
(b) Concern for the health and welfare of 
elderly jurors insisting in desire to 
reach a hasty conclusion to 
deliberations. 
The trial court in ruling against defendant's motion 
for a new trial without comment or explanation would seem to have 
accepted the State's contention that such an affidavit is 
inadmissible and therefore denied defendant a new trial because 
no evidentary hearing was ordered or allowed to determine the 
truth of the allegations in the Juror Garner's affidavit. 
Passing over, for the moment, the issue of the 
admissibility of the affidavit, it would appear clear and beyond 
question that if the allegations were proved true, the defendant 
did not receive a fair and impartial finding by the jury of his 
guilt or innocence. 
Asking God to give a sign to a juror to determine guilt 
or innocence may have some religious efficacy but hardly meets 
the requirements that jurors consider only the evidence presented 
during the trial. 
Inquiring as to the religious affiliation of jurors, 
i.e. determining that all but one of the jurors to be members of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which 
notoriously teaches the efficacy of "divine revelation" then 
announcing to the remaining jurors, what one juror considered to 
be a revelation, i.e. that defendant's attorney had not made eye 
contact at a precise moment during his closing argument, hardly 
seems to be an appropriate and fair means of reaching a verdict. 
Adding to that is the fact that the juror who announced 
her "revelation" also reported during deliberations, but not 
during jury selection, that she had previously been married to a 
child and spouse abuser, contributing immensely to the unfairness 
of the deliberative process. Unfortunately, the same juror was 
discussed in the affidavit as one of the leaders during the 
deliberations. 
In addition, are the further considerations that were 
discussed by the jurors, i.e. that the child may have been 
autistic and that that could account for the defendant's 
"striking the child'1, when the only evidence in the trial was to 
the contrary. Several described him as bright and alert and 
normal. Witness, TJurner described him as a smart boy, knowing, 
at age 3, his ABC's and able to count to 30. No testimony 
disputed that. 
Another juror revealed during the trial deliberations, 
but not during jury selection she had worked with abused 
children, suggesting a sympathy for "abused children" and an 
antagonism to anyone even remotely accused of abusing children. 
Another juror reported improper contact with the home 
of the defendant and a vague suggestion to the other jurors that 
she had special knowledge about the facts of the case which was 
not known by the remaining jurors, all of which cumulatively 
tended to deprive the defendant a fair, and unprejudice and 
unbiased jury. 
The issue by the State seems to be that which it made 
in its memorandum in opposition to the Motion for a New Trial, 
that is, that the affidavit of a juror may not even me received 
or considered. 
The State cited cases dealing with civil jury verdicts, 
Wheat vs. Denver & RGWR Co, 122 Utah 418, and others, then 
submitted that State v. Couch, Utah 635 P.2d 89(1981) supported 
that determination. Rule 606 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is 
also cited. 
The defendant submits howeverf that neither the rule 
nor the case is determinative in this case. 
The Rule, 606(b) has not been specifically interpreted 
by the Utah Appellate Courts, as yet. 
The Couch case discussed Rule 41 of the Rules of 
Evidence, which preceded Rule 606(b), which is somewhat changed 
from the old Rule 41. 
The over all thrust of this case and Rule 606 (b) seems 
to be to restrict those activities which appear to be an attempt 
to second-guess the jurors during their deliberations. Jurors 
should, and defendant agrees, feel free to carry on a dialogue 
during deliberations without fear of having, later, to justify 
every proposition or position expressed during the give and take 
of a jury determination. The Couch case states "We cannot 
referree the deliberative process." The Couch case and Rule 
606(b) seem to try to memorialize that principal and provide 
situations where that principal, if unrestricted, would go too 
far, i.e. where "... extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.w 
The State would no doubt like to restrict the 
interpretation of that exception to the rule to the narrow 
confines of bribry or to a verdict by chance. 
Appellant submits that the Couch case only used those 
two situations as examples of exceptions to the rule and did not 
mean to specifically limit exceptions to the very narrow 
corridore exemplified by those two situations. 
When dealing with the criminal justice system, justice 
equity, fairness and truth are powerful considerations. They 
are, in fact, the very foundation of our democratic system and if 
we arbitrarily impose rules or regulations that suppress or 
destroy those foundational blocks we are not only destroying an 
individual we are smothering those essential elements of a 
democratic, free society. 
The fairness of a trial which may take away one's 
liberty or even his life, is too basic an american constitutional 
due process right to be carelessly or lightly dealt away. 
In the instant case, defendant believes that the 
allegations made in the juror, Garner's, affidavit do in fact fit 
even under the most restrictive interpretation one may try to 
apply to both the Couch case and Rule 606 (b), but that that case 
and Rule 606 (b) were not meant to be as restrictive as the State 
would suggest. 
This is not simply a case of a juror allegedly 
misunderstanding an instruction given by the court. The Couch 
case in excluding the affidavit, commented that "... the 
affidavit under consideration here contains no suggestion that 
the verdict was arrived at by a means other than the f fair 
expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors.1" That, 
alone, suggests the Court might well have been willing to 
consider something that was arrived at by means other than the 
fair expression of opinions on the part of all jurors! 
In this case, the allegations of Garner's affidavit 
would, to all fair-minded observers clearly suggest the verdict 
was arrived at by means other than by the fair expression of 
jurors1 opinion* 
One juror announced she had prayed for a sign and did 
not receive the specific sign she prayed for. To an assembled 
group who acknowledged membership in a religious organization 
that teaches revelation from God in all the affairs of life to be 
a true principle of life, would certainly appear to fit into the 
definition of an "outside influence," 
That same juror, for the first time revealed that she 
believed herself to have been married to, and c* fortiori, a 
victim of, a spouse and a child abuser, a factor that certainly 
would constitute an outside and even devastating influence on 
her. When she emerges as the leader of the faction for 
conviction, the mischief she represents to the principal of a 
fair trial becomes even more overwhelming. 
If that were all, it would appear to be sufficient, but 
add to that unstable beginning the fact that another juror is 
alleged to have, for the first time, announced she had previously 
worked with abused children. The presumption that that 
experience has created in her a sympathy for abused children in 
general and perhaps even an antagonism toward anyone who even 
might be accused of being a child abuser, is too apparent to 
overlook. That outside influence - apart from the evidence 
actually introduced at trial - simply must come outside the 
limitation imposed by the Couch case and Rule 606 (b). 
But that again, is not all. One juror is reported to 
have obliquely announced that she had gone by the home of the 
defendant "and knew exactly what was going on," suggesting she 
had information about the case not garnered from the testimony 
and evidence presented at the trial. 
In fact, all the testimony introduced during the trial, 
was to the effect that nothing nefarious, evil or illegal did go 
on, by numerous witnesses, but her suggestion certainly was an 
"extraneous prejudicial information" as referred to in Rule 
606(b) • 
And as an overlay to all of that, is the suggestion in 
the affidavit that two elderly jurors were in ill health 
physically and emotionally to the extent that they were of 
concern to the remaining jurors and that that concern was of 
primary importance, not the reaching of a true and just verdict! 
Finally discussion of the child being autistic, which 
presumably was suggested as a rationalization by the jurors that 
the defendant became angry and did what he was accused of doing, 
in spite of no evidence whatever that the child was autistic -
even evidence to the contrary so that they could, in good 
conscience find him guilty - would strongly suggest to the court 
that the defendant did not - could not - have received a fair 
trial* 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the defendant submits (1) that the State 
has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
the crime of 2nd Degree Murder, or (2) at the very least, 
defendant should be granted a new trial. 
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